The Global Sociology Blog

The Global Studies Association conference is actually interesting because it still human-sized (unlike the ASA), so, there aren’t too many sessions, you can attend most of them, the attendance is not monstrous, so you get to talk to the speakers, and quite a few prestigious ones too.

This year’s conference, at Pace University in New York City, was titled The Nation in the Global Era . So, of course, the big question, which has been hotly debated ever since the academic recognition of globalization as a significant phenomenon (itself a hotly debated topic), was that of the relevance of the modern nation-state in the global era. In a more nuanced fashion, the sessions centered around the transformation, role and relevance of the nation-state in the global context.

Of course, the answers vary from the Marxist "the state still matters and the US is still an hegemon, albeit a declining one" (Wallerstein) to the more globalist or alter-globalist "the state is no longer the proper unit of analysis" (Robinson) or "the state apparatus is one level penetrated by, and promoting, global mechanisms" (Sassen).

Here, I want to blog about the different sessions I’ve attended, as much as I could make sense of what the hell some of the speakers were talking about. Most of these blog posts are based on my notes and handouts that some speakers provided.

The first one was titled "Identity and Consciousness in a Global Era." The speakers were Lauren Langman, Manfred Steger and Valentine Moghadam.

Lauren Langman being the Marxist representative made the Freudian / Durkheimian case for the persistence of the nation-state as identity-granting / solidarity-based community via nationalism. After all, many of the current conflicts are still nation-based, heck, look at Iraq. So, maybe the old nationalism is dead but we have seen a resurgence of nationalism in the form of ethno-nationalisms and ethno-religio-nationalisms. Ethnic and religious conflicts are nation-based (again, Iraq).

[I have objections right there already: I would argue that these new labels are ethnic and religious groups vying to control state resources (Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka...). They are not strictly nationalist in the sense that they do not look to the nation-state as a source of identity or community. They look to it as a source of power.

The problem, of course, goes to Langman's definition of the functions of the nationalism as desire fulfillment:

• attachment
• recognition
• sense of agency
• values and meaning

Of course, during the heyday of the Westphalian order, nationalism fulfilled these function. Today, I would argue that the source of these are to be found in more local / subnational identities (ethnic) or more global / universal (religious). Not to say that nationalism has completely disappeared (see below) but the case so far seemed pretty weak tea to me... but then, I'm not a Marxist hot shot from Loyola University.]

However, for Langman, new nationalisms such as those visible in the rising economic powers (Russia, China, India and Brazil) are based on two features:

Victimhood and ressentement (Nietzsche) based on prior powerlessness;

These recent nationalist assertions have been facilitated by globalization, rather than emerged against it.

Langman then makes the Marcusian case that globalization is a source of frustration: because of the global inequalities it generates, the fragmentation of communities it is blamed for. How do people cope with these frustrations? Through nationalism (again, I disagree, see above.). Langman then bolsters his case with the four emerging economic powers. Again, I think, in this case, he is somewhat right. There has been indeed a rise in nationalism in all four countries ALONGSIDE a rise in ethno- or religio-nationalism.

[For Langman, ultimately, all the movements he called nationalist are resistance to globalization. Again, I would argue that these movements were actually precipitated and facilitated by globalization.]

Then came my personal favorite: Manfred Steger (I got three pages of notes on his presentation, so fasten your seatbelt and get a snack and something to drink). His presentation was great. I cannot hope to it justice. If anyone is more interested, his presentation was the digest version of his forthcoming book, The Rise of the Global Imaginary (which I will not fail to review… as soon as it is published). So here goes.

Steger’s position is that the national has not disappeared but is being transformed by global dynamics and is being decentered. What Steger is interested in is the transformation of the ideological formations attached to the national imaginaries.

The fact that we are using prefixes such as "neo-" or "post-" to talk about ideological movements tells us that we are still attached to the national imaginaries and forces us to ask the question "what’s new, exactly?"

First, some basic concepts, starting with the distinction between ideology and social imaginary. An ideology is

• widely shared
• created and promoted bu the power structure
• taken to be true
• identity-giving
• a cognitive map (Althusser), indispensable to make sense of the world

The first level, surface level, at which ideologies are visible is through party platforms, for instance.

The second level, the deep level, is that of the social imaginary. A social imaginary

• is the implicit background (pre-reflexive framework, in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms)
• provides a sense of legitimacy
• tells us how we fit together as a community
• defines how we relate to others collectively

The metaphor of the iceberg is appropriate here: the 10% visible is the ideology level whereas the submerged part is the level of the social imaginary. For about 150 years, our social imaginaries have been colored by the nation. The era approximately from 1789 (French Revolution!!) until 1989 is the age of the national imaginaries.

Whether we are talking about liberalism, conservatism, fascism or socialism (in the form of welfare socialism or socialism in one country), the social imaginary behind all of them is the national.

But now, we are in a sort of interregnum where our ideologies are no longer articulated by the national but we are still without clear global imaginaries. We are somewhere in between which is why we referred to the current ideologies as "neo-" (as in neo-liberalism when referring to market ideology) or neo-conservatism (when referring to imperial capitalist ideologies), but both of these refer to the ideology of market globalism. We are beyond the national.

So, we need new typologies to describe these new global imaginaries. We already have global ideologies:

• on the right: market globalism
• on the left: justice globalism
• religious globalism (but no secular globalism which is why the secular camp is on the retreat right now, stuck at the national level and the religious is gaining ground. Osama Bin Laden is one religious figure who understands the importance of global articulation and has taken advantage of it through the global media).

All three are articulations of globalism. In all, the national does not go away but is now mediated by these globalist ideologies that operate at all levels, from the local to the global.

I can’t wait for the book.

Then, it was Valentine Moghadam ’s turn. She went way too long on her preambule and was actually left with little time to get to the heart of her presentation (I hate when people do that… rehearse and time yourself, darn it). The title was Feminism and Nationalism in the Middle East.

From a feminist perspective, the first noticeable thing is, of course, the absence of women from the analyses of the late Charles Tilly, Michael Mann or even Mary Kaldor. But women did play a significant role in decolonization and nationalist movements in the Global South and there is still a strong feminist nationalism in the Middle East (and also in Iran).

However, after decolonization, feminist nationalist groups treated nationalist governments with suspicion as women were progressively relegated to their reproductive role precisely in the name of nationalism. This emphasis on reproductive role relegated women to the domestic sphere (as opposed to the public sphere, for instance, the political arena).

And as nationalist governments compromised (Algeria, Egypt) or were replaced by religious groups (Iran, and we can count Iraq there as well), the marginalization of women went further since their roles were then defined by the scriptures. However, both nationalist and religious movements emphasized the biological and symbolic role of women in terms of reproduction, nurturing and moral values. (Again, that was supposed to be the preamble and by the time she got to that point, she could only mention feminist Persian nationalism in Iran and that was it).